

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-10 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01

INR-10 IO-03 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-01 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03

PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-14 USIA-04 TRSE-00

RSC-01 NSC-07 DRC-01 /080 W

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P R 111540Z OCT 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0504

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0316

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: SOVIET /FRG OCTOBER 9 BILATERAL

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0312

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE OCTOBER 9 AD HOC GROUP
MEETING, CHAIRED BY ITALIAN REP (CAGIATI), FRG REP
(BEHRENDS) REPORTED ON HIS OCTOBER 9 BILATERAL
CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET REP (KHLESTOV), CAUTIONING
THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE REFERRED TO IN DISCUSSIONS WITH
OTHER EASTERN DELS. BEHRENDS REPORTED THAT, IN THE COURSE
OF PROBING FOR BONN'S THINKING ON MBFR, KHLESTOV ATTRIBUTED
CURRENT EASTERN RETICENCE ON THEIR "FIRST STEP" PROPOSAL

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TO THE NEGATIVE ALLIED RESPONSE TO THIS PROPOSAL.KHLESTOV ALSO

RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF A COMMON CEILING INCLUDING AIR FORCE PERSONNEL AND INQUIRED WHETHER THE FRG WOULD "PARTICIPATE IN FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS IF WE ACCEPT THE COMMON CEILING;" ON THIS LAST POINT, BEHRENDS TOLD AHG THAT HE UNDERSTOOD KHLESTOV WAS IN FACT REFERRING TO GLOBAL UNEQUAL CEILINGS RATHER THAN THE WESTERN COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. KHLESTOV'S OTHER COMMENTS REFER TO NATIONAL CEILINGS DATA, REVIEW CLAUSES AND THE FIXED PERIOD OF TIME. TEXT OF BENHRENDS REPORT IS BEING TRANSMITTED BELOW.
END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT:

I HAD LUNCH WITH MR. KHLESTOV ON OCTOBER 9 AT MY INVITATION. MAIN POINTS OF CONVERSATION WERE:

1. TO MY ARGUMENT THAT IN THIS ROUND EAST SEEMED TO HAVE MOVED BACK TO ITS STARTING POSITION OF NOVEMBER LAST YEAR, KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT THE ARGUMENT WAS MUCH MORE VALID IF APPLIED TO THE ATTITUDE OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. SOVIETS HAD ON THE STRENGTH NOT ONLY OF IMPRESSIONS IN VIENNA BUT ALSO OF REPORT OF EMBASSIES IN VARIOUS CAPITALS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD LOST INTEREST IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WAS EXERTING STRONG INFLUENCE WITHIN NATO IN ORDER TO SLOW DOWN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND POSTPONE TO A DISTANT FUTURE EVENTUAL REDUCTIONS OF THE BUNDESWEHR. I REFUTED THIS ARGUMENT.

2. I POINTED OUT THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF A PROLONGED STANDSTILL IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. IF FOR INSTANCE THE US SENATE GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THIS MIGHT LEAD TO UNILATERAL WITHDRAWALS AND A CONSEQUENT BREAKDOWN OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. KHLESTOV WAS UNIMPRESSED BY MY ARGUMENT. HE SAID THAT THIS KIND OF DEVELOPMENT WAS MOST UNLIKELY TO HAPPEN.

3. WHEN I INQUIRED ABOUT THE EASTERN FIRST STEP PROPOSAL, KHLESTOV CLAIMED THAT HE HAD SHOWN GREAT SECRET

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FLEXIBILITY. THE WEST HAD FINALLY TAKEN A NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TO THE FIRST STEP APPROACH AND STATED THAT THEY WERE NOT INTERESTED IN IT. THIS BEING SO, HE SAW NO POINT IN PURSUING THE FIRST STEP IDEA.

4. KHLESTOV ASKED ME WHY THE WEST DID NOT PROPOSE A COMMON CEILING WHICH INCLUDED AIR FORCE PERSONNEL. I ASKED HIM WHY THE EAST DID NOT PROPOSE IT, WHETHER

THE EAST WOULD ACCEPT IT IF THE WEST PROPOSED IT AND WHETHER HE WAS REFERRING TO IDEAS LAUNCHED BY MR. KVITSINSKY IN AN EARLY STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. KHlestov did not react to these questions. I pointed out that given the strength of air force personnel on both sides the inclusion of air force personnel in the common ceiling would not significantly affect the disparity in ground force personnel. Khlestov replied smilingly: "WHO KNOWS?" Khlestov brought up the exclusion of armaments in the western common ceiling concept and asked whether the west would accept a common ceiling also on all major pieces of armaments including anti-tank weapons and artillery pieces. When I pointed out that this might be a bad deal for the east, he changed the subject. I had the impression that he brought up the question of armaments mainly to blur his traces with respect to his first question.

5. KHlestov asked me: "WOULD YOU PARTICIPATE IN FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS IF WE ACCEPT THE COMMON CEILING? (HE SUBSEQUENTLY GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS THINKING OF OVERALL (AND UNEQUAL) CEILINGS RATHER THAN A COMMON CEILING, BUT THIS BLURRING OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HIS QUESTION MAY HAVE BEEN INTENTIONAL.) IN REPLY, I EXPLAINED THE NECESSITY OF A PHASED APPROACH AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MOVES WE HAD MADE TO REACH MIDDLE GROUND ON THIS ISSUE. KHlestov explained that the Soviet Union was not ready to reduce its forces unless it knew precisely how much and at what time the other direct participants would reduce. He repeated this when I asked him about the significance of remarks of Mr. Sturlak in the informal of October 8 about the importance of a mutual obligation to reduce. KHlestov did not seem to attach particular importance to

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THESE REMARKS, NOR DID HE MENTION THE SUBJECT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT ALL.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

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6. KHLESTOV ARGUED THAT NATIONAL CEILINGS WERE NECESSARY BECAUSE UNDER AN OVERALL CEILING, THE FRG WOULD BE FREE TO INCREASE ITS FORCES TO MAKE UP FOR REDUCTIONS BY OTHER FORCES IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THAT WESTERN CONCERNS AGAINST NATIONAL CEILINGS WERE TO A LIMITED EXTENT UNDERSTANDABLE AND THAT SOME SYSTEM HAD TO BE DEVISED TO MEET SOME OF THESE CONCERNS. HE SAID THAT HE COULD UNDERSTAND IF EUROPEANS WISHED TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES TO MAKE UP FOR A DEFICIT WHICH WOULD RESULT IF THE UNITED STATES SHOULD DECIDE TO WITHDRAW MORE FORCES THAN THEY ARE OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW UNDER A

REDUCTION AGREEMENT. IN THAT CASE A REVIEW PROCEDURE

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MIGHT HELP AND THE PROBLEM COULD BE TAKEN CARE OF BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. I REPLIED THAT THIS IDEA, WHICH SEEMED TO BE IMPROVISED, WAS MOST UNHELPFUL. IT WAS ENTIRELY OUT OF QUESTION THAT THE WEST WOULD ALLOW THE SOVIET UNION TO INTERFERE IN ANY WAY IN THE SOLUTION OF NATO'S OWN DEFENSE PROBLEMS.

7. KHLESTOV ARGUED THAT IN EAST AND WEST HE SAW TRENDS TOWARDS MORE NATIONALISM. IT WAS THEREFORE MOST UNLIKELY THAT A EUROPEAN ARMY WOULD EVER COME ABOUT. KHLESTOV ARGUED THAT THE CONCEPT OF OVERALL CEILINGS HAD SURELY EMANATED FROM BONN. IT MADE SENSE FROM A GERMAN POINT OF VIEW SINCE THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WOULD NOT WISH TO HAVE A CEILING ON ITS FORCES WHILE COMPARABLE POWERS LIKE THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE HAD NOT. I TRIED TO EXPLAIN TO HIM THAT HE MISUNDERSTOOD ENTIRELY THE MOTIVES FOR WESTERN POSITION TO NATIONAL CEILINGS.

8. WHEN I SUGGESTED A DISCUSSION OF DATA, KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT THE NEED TO DISCUSS DATA AROSE ONLY AFTER AMOUNTS OF REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN AGREED. HE ASKED ME WHETHER I REALLY BELIEVED THAT AN ISOLATED DISCUSSION OF DATA SERVE ANY PURPOSE AND THAT AGREEMENT ON DATA WAS POSSIBLE BEFORE AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN REACHED OR AT LEAST WAS IN SIGHT.

9. KHLESTOV DISCUSSED VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES OF REVIEW. HE STATED THAT A REVIEW WHICH REQUIRED AGREEMENT BY ALL WAS OF LITTLE VALUE OR IMPORTANCE. A REVIEW WHICH GAVE THE SOVIET UNION THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE UNILATERALLY A PHASE I AGREEMENT WAS A DUBIOUS GIFT. IT WAS POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO RE-INTRODUCE FORCES INTO THE REDUCTIONS AREA ONCE THEY HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN. SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES HAD CLAIMED THAT THE WESTERN SUGGESTION OF A REVIEW CLAUSE WAS A TRICK WITH SINSISTER MOTIVES BEHIND.

10. KHLESTOV ASKED WHETHER THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD FOR THE REVIEW AND NON-INCREASE WOULD BE ADDED TO THE 18-MONTH PERIOD OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIRST
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PHASE AGREEMENT. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THE NATO POSITION.

11. KHLESTOV'S MAIN THRUST IN THIS CONVERSATION SEEMED TO BE AIMED AT DISCOVERING FRG THINKING ON MBFR IN GENERAL. AS SOME OF HIS REMARKS WERE UNORTHODOX AND MADE IN A FREE-WHEELING MANNER, THEY SHOULD NOT BE ACCORDED UNDUE IMPORTANCE. NOR SHOULD THEY BE REFERRED TO IN DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER EASTERN DELEGATIONS.
END TEXT.RESOR

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